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.' CHAPTER I 
REVIVAL OF INTEREST IN TELEOLOGY 
The philosopher has always .c~aimed inquiry into 
... .., 
the ultimate causes as bis peculiar field. He observes 
phenomena with a view to their interpretation. He asks 
the eternal ttWhy?u of things. For a. time he may l)e con-
tent with knowing how the objects of his observation o~-
erate, or simply that they operate, but he 'flill not be 
satisfied till he knows thi\11.y?1t This wonder, this cur-
iosity to know the reasons for things, and the ab~lity 
to answer his own inquiries is one of mants most prom-
inent characteristics. 
For nearly three centuries men have been amazed 
at the wonders of science and dLscovery, and enthralled 
with the pleasures they afforded. They have delighted 
in their inventions as children around their Christmas 
tree, flitting from one toy to another, content to know 
that everything worked and that all was theirs. A few 
ca tch words, evolution, "it just unrolledu ; atomism, tti 13 
is made up of p~,rtslt; mechanism, "it works"; furnished 
all the explanation to which most people had time to 
listen. There were other toys to be examined. 
During more than two hundred years after Descartes 
5 
I 
.' it was the fashion in non-scholastic circles to overlook 
or to sneer at any hint of intrinsic purpose in the world. 
Spinoza ~~d Leibnitz continually opposed the notion of 
intrinsic finality in the universe~. and Hume, denying 
all causali ty, ''fished especially to stamp out all Sllper-
stitions favoring final cause. The order which had come 
into the "chaos of the poets" was su~posed siI:1ply to have 
evolved, lmrolled, according to the laws of nature. But 
Ih,Vhe:'ce those laws?" Tha t was an unfair question. And 
.tFor what purpose was the evolution?" Only the Dark Age 
II':an could have proposed such a query. 
l'iIinds alert to current thought, however, perceive 
that the curiosity of the world is being gorged with 
novelties and facts. Men are beginning to seek nnder-
6 
sta~ding. True to their human nature they are becoming 
philosophers and asking, ttWhat does it all mean?" "Whither 
does it lead?" The answer to these questions leads the 
inquirer into the subject of final causes. 
Since late in the nineteen~h century finality has 
had new defe~ders 11'1. many fields of lmowledge. Dilthey"s 
psychology of history, Stern's "personalism," Driesch's 
vitalism, and Wertheimer's nGe~alt" psychology are all 
approaches to final i ty. Many French phi"losophers, notably 
Jouffroy, Janet, Renouvier, Boutroux, and Ravaisson have 
I 
sincerely championed teleology, though not always in~ 
the scholastic sense of the te:rn1, and have done much 
in l~ance to overshadow the uXlcJeserved po:r:mlari ty of 
mechanism. Eenderson' s t"\'Vo books, ~~_t!':.~_~_~ of .~}~e_ ~nvi~­
onment and Order of l:atll..re caused 1o::drne stir in this 
country -([hen first publlshed. Llo'yd .l,iorgcn' s tbeory 
of Emergent Evolution describes a development from matter ,. 
through the lower forms of life to the suprene goal 
which is mind. Professor Greenywod' s rece~lt book, Biol-
ogy and Ohristial1 ~~:.~}:ief, also favors a ))u..rposi ve outlook. 
;:.ioreover, the philosophy of value, at bottom a In~oblem 
of finality, has in recent years become slJ..rprj.sinsly 
popular. 
This nevI trend in sclence 8nd philoso})hy lends 
r.1ore than usual propriety to discussions o! the scho1as-
ti.c doctrine of final causes. 
7 
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CHAPTER II 
.' 
THE SCHOLASTIC THEORY OF PIl~AL CAFS:;};S 
St. Thomas has written much and well on the subject 
of final causes. !Ie gives brief, £-w-sp proofs for the ob-
,iectivity of final causes and the principle of finality. 
Yet, he and his contemporaries were more inclined than 
men of our more sceptical age to tak~ the existence of 
final causes for granted, and to insist chiefly on the 
teaching of reason and revelation regarding the greatest 
of all final ca"Llses, the final ca"\)se of man. Our mod-
ern mechanistic school, however, has grown up outside the 
scholastic traditions, and has failed to appreciate the 
value of its centuries' store of speculation. As a re-
8 
sult students under mechanistic tutelage have been occu-
pied with more fU:'ldamental problems of teleology, doubting ,.. 
even whether final causes really exist. rrhe principal 
intention of tr~s paper \rlll be to point out the pro-
priety of the doctrine of scholastic philosophy on final 
Ca1.1SeS as an explanation of the order of nature and of 
the de teruine d charac ter of ns. tllrRl phenomena. For sake 
of clarity, however, we shall begin with a few more gen-
eral notions. 
Final cause is usually defined as ttthat for the 
sake of which something is done. n 1 In general, final 
I 
or purposive activity means action with an end in view; 
• 
making use, therefore, of apt means to attain an end; 
acting from a motive with purpose, design, or plan. Psy-
chologically the ~otion of end arises from our own ex-
perience. We take medicine in ord~r-to be healed; we 
'i"lOr1C to make, a living; we fight a war to preserve our 
country's liberty. A hundred times a day we go somewhere, 
• or do something in order to obtain or accomplish some 
desired end. These ends are the motives from which we 
act. Our free will allows us to cho.ose our motiires, to 
accentuate one or other of many possible motives. This 
motive or end is always some apprehe~1ded good either 
2 
re8.l or apparent. It must be a good because we never 
place an action with the intention th~t it will redound 
to our own complete disadvantage. It must be apprehended 
because it is impossible to strive for, or even to desire 
9 
a good of which we are entirel~v ignorant. The reco€Di tion, 
therefore, of an oo,ject or an action as advantageous or 
desirable to ourselves is an absolutely necessary con-
dition for it to operate as a cause determining our 
delibera te acts. 
But while recognition of the end is a condition, 
the end itself is more than a condition. Causes and con-
ditions must be clearly distinguished. A condition is 
sometimes called in scholastic terminology a r~ns 
I 
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.P!.().11.~.!J.E3.~~.. Wi thin the defini ti on of condition come a1'1 
thJ.ngs that consist in the removal of obstacles that would 
prevent an action from taldng place, or in the posi tina; 
of circumstances which would facilitate it. A cause, on 
the other hand, actually assists it~ringing something 
into being, or in effecting some change, which, of itself, 
assuming even that all necessary CO~~itions were present, 
could not have come about. 
An illustration will show plainly the difference 
between the two notions. Gravity is the cause of water 
running through a canal. But a necessary condition is 
that the locks be open. Without gravi ty as a cs.use, 
the mere lifting of the gates, the condition, could never 
effect the flow of water. Applying the comparison to 
motivated action, a little reflection will reveal to us 
that the end of our striving is more than a condition. 
It drives us to action. The ambition to become a doctor 
mal{es a young man go through years of gruelling study, 
almost ruining his own health in order to be able to save 
that of others. An end, therefore, at least in human 
affairs, is a cause, not the only cause, but a cause 
nevertheless, which incites men to do that which without 
the end they would not and could not do. 
Thus, it is quite obvious that persons, when they 
I 
11 
act deliberately, do so because of some definite end ~ 
they have in mind. The real problem of teleology, how-
ever, is usually consldered to -:.;e tbe question whetber 
non-intellectual nature is influenced by final causes • 
. 
Schole.stic philosophers have alwayii' ~ld that fine.l causes 
are operative here also. St. Thomas writes: 
It r:lUS t be observed that a thi.g tends to an end, 
by its action or movement, in two ways: first, as a 
thing moving itself to the end,--as man; secondly, 
as a thing moved by another to the end, as an arrow 
tends to a determinate end through being moved by the 
archer, who directs his action to the end. Therefore 
those things that are possessed of reason, ::nove them-
selves to an end; because they have dominion over their 
ac tions, tb.-roueh their free will 'which is the faculty 
of will and reason. But those things that lack rea-
son tend to an end, by natural inclination, as being 
moved by another and not by themselves; since tbey 
do not know the nature of an end as such, and conse-
quently cannot ordain a~ything to an end, but can be 
ordai. ned to an end by another. For the en tire ir-
rational nature is in comparison to God as ~~ instru-
ment to the principal agent •••• Consequently it is ..... 
proper to the irrational nature to tend to an end, 
as directed or led by another, whether it apprehend 
the end, as do irrational animals, or do not appre-
hend it, as is the case of those things which are 
altogether void of knowledge. 3 
The phrase to be insisted on here, as is clear 
from other related passages,. is that irra.tional beings, 
animals, trees, etc., tend to their ends by natural 
inclination. The idea is not that they are moved only 
by an extrinsic cause as a pebble by the foot, but t}:11'.l. t 
the extrinsic cause, their Creator, has impressed His 
4 
own purpose upon natural bodies, so that in tending 
I 
accordi~g to their natures to their own ends, they al:? 
act instrumentall:; according to the Creator's intention. 
A word about the way in which the final cause 
12 
operates will help to a better understanding of its nature • 
..... 
Final influence can be best studied in tr.ose beings where 
it is most evident, namely in intellectual beings. We 
have seen t!.1at final cause is no mere. condi tion, but a 
true cal1se. Its influence, however, must be distinguish-
ed from that of efficient ca1Jse. Efficient causes pro-
duce their effects by physical action as when a horse 
pulls a wagon. The finru cause produces its rosults 
on the actions of persons Simply by being an attractive 
object which, however, must be apprehended and desired 
as a good. ItJust as the efficient cause has its influ-
ence by acting, so the final cause has its influence 
5 
by being desired and sought after." Bfficient cause 
actually exists when it is a cause. Final cause q~B: 
cause does not yet exist except in the consciousness 
of the one desiring it. It is an oojecti ve reali ty, not 
actual, but possible. As soon as it becomes actual it is 
no longer a cause, but an effect. Hence the distinction' 
6 
between the end intended and the end attained. It is only 
the end intended ~lich acts causally. 
The chief influence of final cause consists in 
I 
initiating and directing the operation of the aeent or 
.' 
efficient cause. 
The end is the cause of the efficient cause, not, 
however, in so far as it is a being, but in as much 
as it is a cause. For the efficient cause is such 
in so far as it acts; but i t do~i. not act except 
for the sake of the end. 7 
The fact that the efficient cause always produces 
a determined effect is also due to fita1 cause. 
'\liere an 8.,'!,ent not to act for a definite effect, 
all effects w01}ld be indifferent to it. Now that 
which is indifferent to many effects does not pro-
duce one rather than another:. wherefore from that 
which is indifferent to either of two effects, no 
effect results, unless it be determined by something 
to one of them. Rence it would be impossible for 
it to act. Therefore every agent tends to some def-
inite effect, which is called its end. 8 
Thus, the fact that an effect is produced j.s due 
to the efficient cause. The fa.ct that a determined 
effect is produced is due to the final cause. Since 
the intention is prior to the action, final cause is 
9 
said to be the first of all the causes. 
All we have thus far said on the operation of 
13 
final cause was largely from the metaphysical point of view. 
It may also be viewed psychologically. The influence 
of the final cause on the ap peti te, as VIe have noted 
above, results from the mere presence of the idea of the 
end in the mind as good or beneficial to the one to whom 
I 

by God we do not wish to imply that we call upon the pa-
ture of God to prove the existence of final causes in the 
world. Rather the opposite. The existence of God can 
be proved from final causes. If we should attempt to 
. 
prove the existence of final ca.use] --rrom the :na ture of 
15 
God, we should apparently be arguing in a circle, though we 
should not necessarily do so. We mi~ht first establish 
the existence of God from other arguments. After that 
we could infer from God's rational nature that no object 
of His creative power would be purposeless. Perhaps 
this would be the only way to prove that there 'l'as no 
instance of di sorder in the world; that all evil serves 
some purpose either :oroximate or remote. To assert that 
disorder is impossible, however, is not necessary to bur 
present thesis. Suffice it to prove that there are some 
final causes in irr~tional nature. 
Hence, the argument we propose to the mechanists 
is not: God is an intelligent Creator of the nniverse; 
but an intelligent Creator would not create except for 
a. purpose; therefore, there is purpose, design, finality 
in the universe. Our argument is rather: there is an 
order manifest in the world; but there can be no order, 
plan, or deSign, without final causes; therefore, there 
are final causes in the universe (subject ultimately, 
of course, to a directive supra-mundane Intelligence). 
I 
It may have already been noted that the exist~ce 
of a Sl1preme Intellige"ce is assumed in this paper. It 
is, indeed, rather assumed than proved, although the fact 
of final causes cannot but imply It. When archaeologists 
discover bits of pottery, weapons?~r bone instrmnents, 
they always attribute them to beings with intellects, 
not to monkeys, or much less to chance atomic formations • 
• ~!Ihy are rot mechani ats as logical when they find the 
more marvelous productions of natu~e? It is probably 
the fear of theism as a logical con~lusion rather than 
any intrinsic difficulty in the concept of final causes 
tha.t has led evolutionists and mecha'1ists to deny them. 
01.1!' contention is, however, that we can esta.blish 
the existence of final causes before we establish the 
Intelligence. In other words, as the minor of the above 
argument states, order and design necessarily imply pur-
pose or finality. The proof of this proposition will 
16 
be developed in the course of the paper. Here it is mere- I 
ly stated. The argument is based partly on a perfect 
analogy between the actions of intelligent and non-intel-
ligent natures, but especially on the fact that, denying 
finality, there is ~o intelligent explanation of nature's 
order. All will admit that irrational natures acting 
according to definite laws attain to a perfection that 
is suitable to them. This fact calls for an explanation. 
The mechanistic attitude is agnostic. The scholasti~. 
philosophy does offer an intelligible if not comprehen-
sive eXDlanation of order and regulari ty in nat1.U'e by 
recognizing in each individual nature an intrinsic nrin-
. 
c iple of developMent and perfec tj.dh ...... lhich ultimately 
is considered to have been implal1ted there by the Wisdom 
and Power of its Creator. 
Before closing the general discussion of final 
causes mention should be made of two divisions which 
are frequently referred to in treatises on finality in 
na ture. The older scholastics called them .f~~2:.~ gp_eris 
and f~n~s operantis. We shall follow an equally comrnon 
1'7 
usae:e by calling them intrinsic and extrinsic final causes. 
The intrir'sic final causes or ends of natural bodies are 
those which are adapted. to their own good and perfection. ,... 
Extrinsic ends are those which serve rather the good 
of some other part of the universe. Intrinsic ends of 
a fruit tree, for example, would be growth, fruition, 
and propagation. An extrinsic end would be to furnish 
food for rrnn. To these divisions will corresDond ab-
solute and relative order which will be spoken of in the 
next chapter. 
I 
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The end, 1. e. that for the 3e.]~e of which a thing 
is; e.s. heal th is the cause of ':ml}<;:inr,. For '";'Ihy 
does o:.ce VI8.l'c?' we say; 'that one Y!lay be healthy'; 
and in spe'-1.~dng thus we think we he. 'ie r~i ven the cal;.se. 
Aristotle, ketaphysica, W.D..·1:~oss, editor (Oxford: 
the Clarendon Pr0·s's,· T~;T28T, lib~ Delta, 2, 1013 a 33. 
No':v tba t to which an ap;en t tonds def::ll1 tely must 
needs be befittin~ to that 8.;ent: since the latter 
Vlould,,-ot te:1cl to it save on acc<iuJ.'1t of some fi ttin:>;ne ss 
thereto. 3ut trJa t vlhj.ch is befi 'f;tin~: to a t>'ing 
is good for it. Therefore ever;T agent ac ts for a good. 
st. Tho:mas, The ,cherma Contra Gentiles, tr. by t:je 
Fathers of t:'J.e Enro,lish IJOniTiii"c-a-ri ?~rovi::1c-e-··-rt"ondon~ Burns, 
Oates, and ~4:o.3hbourne Ltd., 1928), Bk. III, ch. 3. 
St. Thomas, rrhe U Summa Theologica It, tr. by the 
Fathers of the En;:;lish :oom:cn.{c·an -ProVr-rlce (2nd edj. tion; 
London: Burns, Oates, and 'Nashbourne Ltd., 1927), I-II, 
q. 1, a. 2. 
4. The tern: ;1a tural body is used in tbis paper in 
contradistinct:i.on to implements or machinery, for this 
class of oi):iects ·oears tne stamp of man's intelli;"ence, 
and they are obvL:;usly made a'ld onera ted for a 'JUT'POS e. 
"Sicut auteTn. influere causae efficientis est agere, 
influere causae finalis est appetl et desiderari. u 
St. Thomas, De Veri~ate (vbl. 9, Onera Omnia, 
Parmae: Tyois Petrl-PlaccadorI, 1859), 11-=--~;r2,- a~--2-; 
how an e0d is possessed in two ways; perfectly 
and imperfectly. Perfectly, ..... lnen it is possessed 
not only in intention but slso in reality; imper-
fectly, when it is posoessed in intention only. 
St. 'J:'homa8, The ttSUJil1ilO.. Theolo;>:ica u , tr. by the I,'ath-
era of tl:e EnFllsh Dominican-Pr-ovirice--r2nd edi tion; 
London: burns, Oa te s, and Washbo'l1I'ne Ltd., 1927), I-II; 
q. 11, a. 4 • 
. .,. St. Thor;:ns, .~Y..l: ~iet:~p.)~, (vol. 20, .o.E.~.r_11. Omnia, 
Parmae: Typi8 Petri :?ia c-Fadori, 1866) lib. V, le6":··-2. 
St. 'rl".omas, The ,Summa Contra Gentiles, tr. by 
English Dominican Fatheirs· TLon-aon":-131frn-s, Oates, and 
hbourne Ltd., 1928), Bk. III, ch, 2. 
I 
-The end holds the highest -,,12_ce amonr; the Ca-tlS~S, 
and it i,- from it that all other causes derive t:heir 
actual causality; since the agent acts ~ot except 
for the end ••• and it is due to the a;:~ent that the 
'o~a tter is brought to the actuali t:'J of the form: 
wherefore the r;:a tter is made BC tl.lally the rna tter, 
B.nd t"be form is mode the form, of this particular 
thinr~, throu9'h the agent IS acti@n, and consequent-
ly tbr01..l(~h the end. The later end also, ls tLe C9.11Se 
of th~ precedin~ end being intended as an end: for 
a thinp is not moved towards a proximate end, ex-
cept for the sake of the last end. Therefore the 
last end is the first cause of a~l. 
I~~d., ch. 17. 
19 
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CHAPTER I I I 
." 
TEE ORDER OF :lJkJ:URE 
Before considering the fact of the order from which 
we shall argue to the existence of;. 'tinal causes in ne. ture 
it will be helpful to enucleate the concept of order. 
According to scholastic authors three things are requir-
ed to fulfil the notion of order: i~ things to be or-
dered; 2) certain relations of position or succession; 
1 
3) a principle of order. Moreover, in all order two 
things are implied: 1) an intelligent orderer, and 2) 
a reason for ordering. If we take the exampJe of an army, 
the soldiers are the objects to be ordered; their divis-
ion into companies or battalions would estabJish the 
rela tions of position or succes sion; the prinCiple of the 
division or order might be the number of years of exper-
ience, the nationality, or the type of arti1Jery which 
the various groups are accus tomed to operate. The or-
derer implied is the general, and the purpose will de-
pend upon his intentions. We I1'1fl.y presume that it is the 
hope of victory. Order, therefore, ~ay be defined as 
an exact arrangment of things in their proper positions 
Or rela tions according to the requirements of the end 
2 
in view. 
To distinguish between the ordered systems set 
I 
21 
up by mtn and the order of na ture the former is calle.d 
artificial order while the latter is styled natu~al. 
From the scholastic teleologist's point of view the on-
ly difference between artificial and natural' order is 
in the principle. In artificial a'riter the principle 
is extrinsic to the objects ordered; that is, the ob-
jects are indifferent to the norm. In the above example ., 
the soldiers are equally capable of being eli v~_(ted accor-
ding to anyone of the three norms. In nature the prin-
ciple is intrinsic. It is stable and unchanging. This 
notion of stability, however, is not meant to exclude the 
possibility of 310w evolutionary development. It meaYJ.8 
merely that at any Given time natural arsents act in a 
determined manner ar:.d according to laws, which, if they 
are knqv./n, permit predict£lbili ty of effects wi thin a 
c'lose margin of accuracy. 
To the :r:lechanist, however, the two ulterior impli-
cations of order, namely, the oI'derer and a purpose in 
the sense of a final cause, are superfluous when there is 
question of natural order. He concelves nat'ure as a sys-
tern of bodies endowed with certain forces which under 
given conditions cannot help producing their effects. 
He Gn.mi ts effieient causes, and thinks therein is had 
the full explanation of the activities of nature. The 
scholastic teleologist also recofnizes the forces of 
I 
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no. ture, but he sees still more. He sees a tend_ency in 
the forms of natl~e towards a ~erfective goal for which, 
try as he may, he ca~not account b:r indiscriminate forces. 
He is convinced tha t the various nat1..U'al bodies are pos-
sessed of an intri"sic principle ];ihdi"g them wi thout 
fail, unless there is some external interfererJ_ce, to a 
fixed ter~::inus. He may go so far as to define the na-
• 
ture of a natural body as the subst~Llce or essecce of 
that body in so far as it is subject to an interior 
3 
principle of finality. Adequately considered this inter-
nal principle represents an impulse impressed by a Supreme 
Will upon each beinr; by which it tends in a more or less 
regular a:ld. predj_ctable Benner towards a certain fullness 
or rrn turi ty which may be considered its o\'m perfection. 
In order to bring out the idea of the intrinsic 
principle of order in nature, scholastics distir1p;uish 
between absolute and relative order. Relative order is 
that which exists between the various objects of nature. I 
Absolute order is that which is e~tirely within a given 
body regardless of its relations to other bodies. Every 
mineral, plant, and 9_nimal furnishes o.n ezample of ab-
solute order. Abu'ldant ill1-ls tra tions of each v;1ll be gi v-
en ,:)resently. 
The fact of nature's order DO one can deny. 
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Nietzche and Schopenhauer may eX8.ggerate the defects of 
.' 
order; Diderot or Buechner may say that it is due to chance; 
Kant and his disciples may contend that it is a purely 
Dental projection; but Qot o~e of the~ can deny the fact. 
'='here ~_s not a single science' that;;, tl,oes not bear wltness 
to the order of the universe. 
The most cler~raded of savages ,.i\Otiee the rec;ularity 
of the rislng SUI1, and the reCUrre!.lce of the yearly sea-
sons. Our mos t accurate time is detcrmi,1ed lJ:;r the ~re-
cision of the revoh:tions of the stars as observed by 
the astronomer's transit. The same law of gravity that 
holds the stars to their pOSitions or orbits i~ thB hea-
'lens binds our planet to the sun, D.!'HI prevents us from 
being catapulted into space as we speed alons at a rate 
higher than any modern projectile. The atmosphere that 
blankets the earth prevents the sun's rays frol':J. conSUll1-
ing us by day a~ld the heat from escaping at ni&lJ.t. By 
means of their chlorophyl ae tion plants 'use up the carbon 
dioxide exhaled by animals, and release oxygen Bpain into 
the air thus preserving always the bala])ce of p;ases Yleces-
sary for tr.eir mutual benefit. "fa ter is evaporated from 
the ocean by the sun, carried by the wind over the land, 
and dropped in the form of rain to f 1)rnish drink for 
animals and I~oist1..1.re for plants. Tbe surplus is c 01-
lected into rivers and carried back to the sea arain, 
I 
in the meantime furnishing a means of transportation •• ' 
~itrosen, a necessity for fertile soil, is precipitated 
in ~reat quantities from the air li~htninG and soaked 
into ths 2round by tbe rain. It is also gathered in 
. 
surplus q_; anti ties on the roots or~overs and other 
legumincus plants for the use of other crops that need 
it. l.'la.'1Y flowers depend upon bees and otrer insects for 
.. 
pollination. 
The saying that one man's food is another man's 
poison holds good in nat~~e. Almost every creature in 
nature seems to be both a help and a hindrance to some 
other creature. The result is a relative equilibrium. 
Tb.is might be a hard thesis to ~rove, but may be illus-
trated by the bala-~ced aquarium. Eere the larger fish 
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eat the smaller ones. These in turn eat crayfish and ~ 
larger insects, while ir.sects eat the protozoa. The pro-
tozoa feed upon the green plants, and the latter live 
by the refuse of the higher animals. Thus the whole of 
nature seems to be linked together. Animals, plants, and 
minerals are mntually serviceable. Every par t of the world 
seems to fit in harmoniously with every other part. 
The above examples are largely illFstrative of 
extrinsic or relative order. Evidence of puxpose is 
still more striking in the intrinsic construction, ar-
I 
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rangment, and activities of' individual organisms, /?,n<!' 
even in inorganic bodies such as crystals, molecules, and 
atoms. 
Think of' the innumerable v~~ety of organs and parts 
tba t com')ose the human body; their diverse activities 
and tb.eir marvelous combination into one uylified indi vid-
• ual; their cooperation to preserve and perfect that in-
dividual. rrhe body's architectural com~lexity, its ease 
of function, and esthetic coordination .are ilYllneasurably 
more perf'ect than anything man has ever invented. 
The hurlan eye is an ins truT:len t so delicately ad-
,lusted to tbe f'unction of vision that at least a dozen 
conditions must be fulfilled befol'e it can see, and, yet, 
compara ti vely s?J8aking, how few are blindl First a brain 
is presupposed, and there must be nerves running between 
tbe brain and the eye which are a:Jle to bear the i:r.1pression 
of lir;ht. These nerves terminate in a very special Bnd 
impressio;naole tissue called the retina. Various auto-
matic contractions must regulate the focus according to 
. 
the distance of the object. '1'he qua'1.tity of liC;ht allowed 
to enter the e:re is regulaterl by cO;'ltractions of the 
iris. The roels and cones at the nerve ends transform 
the light waves of different lengths into color sensations. 
I 
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The fact that there are two eyes fives the stereoscopic 
~ .' 
effect of three dimensions. One eye can see only two 
dimensi ons. 1; erve coordinations a"c1 numerous tiny muscle s 
enable the two eyes to turn together hither and thither 
and to act ''lormally as one organ. ;;r'~ distinct'-Jess and 
exact sh:1ilari ty of the imac;es on the two retinas presents 
the appearalce of one picture. Tear's r.la}re the cornea 
l;:ore transparent a'.ld renove from it tll dust particle s. 
The sunken posi tion of the eye in the forehead ins1.1res 
4 
its protection. And all this lay hidden in the produc-
tive ?ower of the primitive cell% 
Too much space would be required to eo into such 
detail wi th all the organs, but a few remarks about some 
of the mOre important ones will be in place. How perfect-
ly the stomach and alimentary system is fitted for diges-
tion. The stomach with its juices can dissolve foods and 
meats of ~l kinds, but the acids, with rare exceptions, 
never attack t~e stomach itselfl 
~~o one on examining a pump would deny that it was 
made by an intelligent person for the purpose of pumping, 
Yet the heart, pushing blood to all parts of the body, 
and to those parts e:s)eclally where at a r;:tven time it is 
most needed to feed the body, repair tired muscle, or re-
wove waste, or, finally to be purified in the lungs is a 
I 
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~----------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
to the very bed 'from which they were hatched to lay their 
6 ~ 
et'siY,S an d die. 
Adult eels of the fresh water strear'1S of the 3[11-
tic lea 'fe tbe:1.r home in the autlJ1'1n, . pns s inz Denmark and 
;;'..;, 
England, then turning southwards cross the Atla~tic. 
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They spawn in the depths of the ocean sonthwest of Bermuda, 
then, like the sal~Ilon, die. The nexi s;)rinr-; the :roung 
eels return across the ocean to their fresh water streams 
where they live for four or fivEt years before repeating 
7 
the habits of their ancestors. 
Some of the niore extraordinary instincts are possess-
ed by ants an.r'l honey bees. Shakespeare, rolding the lat-
tor up to man as an eXffil1 ple of obedie':1ce and cooperation, 
poetically summarizes most of their a'uili ties: 
Creatures that by a rule in nature teach 
The act of order to a peopled kinGdom. 
They have a king and officers of sorts; 
Where some, like. magistrates, correct at home, 
Others, like merchants, venture trade abroad, 
Others, like soldiers, armed in their stings, 
1,Iake boot upon the surmner's velvet buds, 
Which pillage they with merry ~arch bring home 
To the tent royal of their emperor: 
Who busied in his majes ty, sv.rveys 
Ths singin~ masons building roofs of gold, 
The civil citizens kneading up the honey, 
The poor mechanic porters crowding in 
Their reavy bUI'dens at his narrow gate, 
The sad-eyed justice, wi th bis surly hum, 
Deliverinp o'er to executors pale 
The lazy yawning drone. 8 
I 
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Similar to the instincts of animals are the tr4'lpisms 
of plants. The roots of a tree will always grow towards 
the moisture, so that if the water is on only one side 
of the tree necrly all the roots will be on that side. 
Their leanin[; towards the light iSi> Well vnorm. These 
are two of the :.-::any tendencies in plants to grow towards 
that which will prove most beneficial to them • 
• 
Many of the instincts of animals are c01?1plemented 
with mechanisms for protection against their enemies, 
and for the acqui.sition of food. l'1early every animal 
has a natural enemy. ':'fhet'.'er it be another animal or 
plant, or variatio21.s, ordinary or extraordinary, of climate 
or other life conditions they generally have some method 
of defet:.se or preservation which enables them to withstand 
tt,eir peculiar o~)posi tion. It wou1d be tedious to mention ,... 
more than the mere classes of defense mechanisms. Some 
animals, e of:: .• , frogs, waE=ing sticks, and katydids are 
protected by the fact that they are indistinguishable from I 
the leaves and green plants which form tIwir usual habi ta ts. 
The chameleon, certain fishes, Q':1.d ether anllnals are 
able eve:::1 to c[-Iange their color to ma tch their surrourld-
ings. .30me defend themselves wi tb stings, and poisonous 
glands; others such as the octupus ano cuttlefish by ink-
throwing glands. Crayfish, crocodiles, turtles, molluscs, 
sea urChins, caddis flies, and porcupines have a pro-
tee ti ve arn:or. 
.' 
Equally diversified as the defense adaptations 
are those which are a help to obtain food. Night feeders 
such as owls generally ha'Je large ey~s, while day feeders 
often rely upon swiftness. The chameleon with its quick 
tongue can capture unwary insects at a d:i.stance of seven 
inches from its body. 
• 
Professor 'J'V'oodruff ab,ost panegyrizes the wonder-
ful utility and apti tnde of the worker bee's leGs to the 
needs of the bee. The ~lotation is a little long, but 
the numerous details could hardly be summarized more 
briefly. It should be remembered tbat this is only one 
example out of thousands which could be cited to illus-
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tra te h.armony between living things and their environment. 
It seems that it sh0uld at least l)rovoke tbe question 
whether some third factor did not fore~ee sEd perhaps 
assist in the mutual fi tting of the environment wi th the 
objects within it. 
The worker is a 'bundle of adaptations' for its 
varied duties. Indeed, when we tal'e away the adapta-. 
tions there is little left! The primitive insect ap-
pendages have become specialized in the worker 3ee, 
so that collectively they constitute l? batter;l of 
tools adapted with great ntcety to the uses for which 
they are employed. This applies to all of the append-
ages of the insect's body, but ~e shall neglect t~ose 
of the bead and conslder onl:! the specializations 
of the three pairs of legs •••• 
I 
The worker Bee's prothoracic (front) legs show 
the following specializations. The femur and tib:ra 
are covered with long, bra:r..ched FEATHERY LAIRS which 
aid in ga th.6ring pollen when the Bee visi ts flowers: 
the tibia, near its junc tion wi t'cl the t8r SlJ S (the 
foot or hand), bears a group of stiff bristles (POL-
LEN BRUSH) which is used to brush together tJ:e pollen 
grains that have been dislodged by the hairs of the 
upper leg-segr(ionts. On the op1i.d~i te side of the leg 
is a co:njJosi te structure, the Al{T~nlJA CLEAW:m, formed 
by a movable plate-like process (VBLTJM) of the tibia 
which fits over a circular notch in the uDper end of 
the tarsus. The notch is provided '.'tith a series 
of bristles which form the teeth~f the ANTEHNA cmm. 
The antennae, or 'feelers,' which are important sense 
organs of the head, are cleaned by being placed in 
the toothed notch and, after the velum is closed 
down, drawn bet"Neen the bristles and the edge of 
the velum. On the anterior face of the first seg-
ment of the tarsus is a series of bristles (EYE 
BRUSH) which is used to remove pollen and other par-
ticles adhering to the hairs on the head about the 
la~ge compound-eyes and interfering with their oper-
ation. The terminal segment of the tarsus of each 
leg is~rovided with 9. T)I'lL-' of notched CLlr.¥S, a 
sticky pad (PULVILLUS) and TACTILE FLAIRS. When the 
Bee is walking up a rough surface, the pOints of the 
claws catch and the pulvillus does not touch, but 
when the surface is smooth, so that the claws do 
not ,r:;rip, they are drawn beneath the foot. This 
change of position applies the yulvillus, a~d it 
clinp;s to the smooth surface. Thus the character 
of the surface automatlcally determines whether claw 
or pulvillus shall be used. But there is another 
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adapta tio"'" equally remarkable. 'The pul villus is 
carried folded in the middle, but opens out when applied 
to a surface; for it has at its upper part an elas-
:bic and curved rod, which straightens as the pulvil-
Ius is pressed down. The flattened-out pullrillus 
thus holds stronr:rly while pulled alonp: the surface 
by the weir:ht of the Bee, but comB8 up at 0'1ce if 
lifted and-rolled off from its opposite Sides, just • 
as we should pull a. wet postage starn;) from an en-
velope. The E:'ee, then, is held securely till it 
attempts to lift the leg, when it is freed at on.ce; 
and, by this exquisite yet simple plan, it can fix 
and release each foot at least twenty times per sec-
ond.' (Cheshire) 
I 
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The characteristic structures of the middle 0:13S0-
THORACIC) legs of the Bee are a small P01IJEN BRUSIoi' and 
a long spine, or SPUR, which is em~loyed inremovinr, 
flakes of wax from the \VAX POCKE'rS of the ventral 
surface of the abdomen. 
The METi~.:rp()RACIC (back) legs exhibit four remar-
kable adaptations to the needs of tl:.e insect, ~mO\m 
aR the POLLEN COM~S, PECTEH, A1lH1CIJ:~, and POLLEN 
BAs:r:ST. The pollen combs comprise a series of rows 
of bristle-like hairs on the inner surface of the 
first segment of the tarsus:- the pecten i;;3 a series 
of spines on the distal e~d of t~e tibia which is 
opposed by a concavity, the auric.le, on the proximal 
end of the tarsal segment; while" the pollen basJret 
is formed by a depression on the outer surface of the 
tibia which is arched over by rows of long curved 
bristles rurising from its edges. 
TroIS the worker is fully equipped. Flying from 
flower to flower for nectar, the Bee brushes against 
the anthers laden vd th pollen, some of which adheres 
to the hairs on its r)Qdy and legs. While still in 
the field, the pollen combs are first brought into 
play to comb the pollen from the hairs, while the 
pectens scrape the 9011en from the combs. Then the 
auricles are manipulated so that the accumulating mass 
of pollen is pushed up into the bristle-covered -
pollen baskets. This process is repeated until the 
baskets are full and then the lnsect returns to the 
hive, wrere the cO.~.tents of the pollen baskets are 
removed by the aid of the spurs wi th which the meso-
thoracic legs are provided. 
Moreover, the structural adantations of the worker 
Bee are but one aspect of a reCiprocal fitness. 
Liany of the flowers which the Bee visits show remark-
able adaptations for the reception of the Bee and 
for dustins it with pollen, because Bees are effective 
agents in the transferring of pollen from flower to 
flower and thus insuring cross-fertilization. 9 
The marvel011s aptitude of aV)imals for their envir-
onment would be in vain if the envirorunent on its part 
were not at least to some extent accommodated to it. 
Henderson elaborates the sui tabili t:'T of the earth and 
I 
its elements to receive and foster the living beings ~l1at 
dwell upon it. The peculiar :9rOpert~l of water by which 
it expands at .4 0 centigrade thus pre'Tenting the seas 
from freezing solid and making sea life impossible is 
but one of the many phenomena trea~. There are th~ee 
elements, hydrosen, carbon, and oxygen whose properties 
are especially suited to sustain living organisms. In-
• deed they largely constitute living things. Of the three 
Fe"derson wri tea: 
They lead ••• to the presence of water end carbon 
dioxide in the at~osphere, and to the meterorological 
cycle. This cycle reGulates the temperature of the 
globe more perfectly thar: it could he regulated by 
any other substances concerned in any similar cycle. 
It produces an almost constant temperature in the 
ocean, as well as constancy of composition and of 
alkalinity. It mobilizes allover the earth great 
quantities of all the elements; it rleposits them 
in great variety and inexhaustible profusion in the 
oec~an; it comminutes and disperses all kinds of 
insoluble minerals, thereby diversifying tbe land; 
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it causes water to penetrate and to remain in nearly 
all localities; and all of tbese processes are more 
perfect or more extensive than they could be if a 
large nmnber of the differert properties of water were 
not-what they are. Thereby the n::reatest variety and 
quantity of structural materials is accumulated. 
I(leanwhile the conditions which make for d1.lrabili ty of 
structures are also assured ••• 
These and many other thinr"s depend upon proper-
ties of hydrogen, carbon, a:1r1 o:XY2~en. They make up, 
I cannot doubt, the most rema:r,}rable group of causes 
of the teleolor:;:tcal appearance of nature. 10 
About carbon also Professor Greenwood has writ-
ten recently:: 
I 
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It may be justly said that, if one tring more than 
another stands unique and in majestic aloofness, 
physicall:T speaking, in the cosmic scheme, it is ~he 
eTement carbon. There does not a)pe9.r to be a s:~np.;le 
as s:i.gnable reas on for such remarl:able propertie s as 
those possessed by carbon (over and above an~ totally 
distinct fro:m others) unless :Lt vlere deliberately 
provided in a plannud scheme that it should in dl l e 
time play the role it does. Eor is this any more 
fantastic a claim than when Sl ... liLvan says the electron 
behaves as if it had foreknowled~e and could calculate 
to an ama~in~ extent. Yet for thousands of millions 
of years, in~our own solar system alone, the carbon 
atom has played its 1jart just like ar.;-T other atom, 
rather IH:e silicon in its ha~')it~, as it ',vere, 11l1til 
life appeor ed. The opr)ortunj. ty arose, no element 
save carbon could supply the fow1dation for that 
as tounding quali ty we c all life, '.Tnt it ';'las t"here, 
read~T to hand 1,'lhen the nee d car;1e. The s tory of car-
bon is y:'.ore prirning,· ;;:ore brea th-taYJ.ng th8.n any 
fiction. Yet there are those who refuse to see any 
sio:nific2.nce i~ this, or a~"y purpose behind it 0.11.11 
'Hhen we descend below the level of living beings 
f:l.nd enter t1,e anor:~anic world, there is no further example 
of conscioUS ir.1manent adaptation. Yet the marvelous de-
signs and determined activities of crystals, molecules, 
ared a tOl~lS leave our ar8l'.I1ent frO~:il analoGY anel sufficient 
roason valid and stronr even in the physical world. 
VIb.erlever t'.'JO elements cOJrlbine to fClrm a compound, 
they always do so according to ~eflnite proportions by 
W0lf':ht. Eight ounces of oxycen and or~e ounce of h:Tdror~<:n 
will always combine in this proyortion and in no other 
to form nine ouY-,ces of water. Thou{h the law of com-
binB tion is stran:7e enough, tLe ato,;:ic tYceory w}-dch 
exnlains it is still ~ore remarka~la. Dalto~, takinG 
I 
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a hint from theories of the old atoy.1ists of Greece, drew 
.' 
up his atomic theory under the su:oposition that the ele-
ments were made up of atoms, ar'd that compounds were made 
'Jf more or less stable aggregates of atorn.s. Furtbermore, 
that all atoms of one element differ.from tb.ose of another • 
.,. ...,. 
To form a compound, therefore, a few atoms of on.e element 
were supposed to combine with a few atoms of another so 
as to form aD aggregate. This repre st n ted the smallest 
uni t of a compound ·Vllbich ca.me to be called a molecule_ 
The Greek mechaDists had indeed thought of atoms, but 
tbey had never imagined that they combi~ed in definite 
proportions, nor could tbey haV3 deduced it logically from 
their system, for they supposed that all atons had the· same 
properties, and, denying finality, they could have assign-
ed no reason why the atorns cOl'l'l combine only in exact 
small proportions. 
A further development of the atomic theor;T ca'ITIe 
when .'\vogadro proposed the molecular theory of gases_ 
The si1:'.ple pro:!Jortions existing between the component 
parts of a gas and between each part and the whole volume 
were explained by supposing tbat j.n any Gas under constant 
tem.pera ture and pressure there were equal numbers of 
:r101ecules no matter from how many atoms the molecvles 
were made up_ This theory, now held as incontestably 
correct, added several pieces of inforf'lation to the former 
I 
knowledge of the atomic theory. By it the relative ~nd 
.' 
absolute weir;ht of the atoms could be calculated, the 
exact number of atoms in a molecule, and, hence, chemical 
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formulae could be determine d. Prom t:his theory also arose 
the notion of vale"lces. 
Orderly patterns likewise abound in crystals. 
A cursory cornparlson of the shapes 01. a collection of 
crystals would 10 ad one to believe that there is an almost 
infinite variety of' forms. 3ut in reality the forms of 
all crystals may be reduced to seven systems depending 
upon what are called their axes. rrhe first or cubic 
system has all its axes the same length, and all at 
right angles to each other. Cormnon table salt is a crys-
tal of this class. Numerous examples could be given of 
all the other classes, the tetragonal, the orthorhoMbic, 
the monoclinic, the triclinic, the tr:Lgonal, and the 
hexagonal. All snow crystals have the general pattern 
of a hexagon, yet marvel of variety, more than four thou-
sands of them he.ve been photographed, v~. thout any two 
having been found alike. The forms are so intricate 
and beautiful that they have often been copied as patterhs 
for fine lace. 
But the design of the crystal does not consist 
merely in the symmetry of its visible form. By the 
I 
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~£very chemical compound has its own peciJ.liar structur~ and 
Y'lOre than three hm1.ored thousands of them are lrnown to 
chemists. By the structure form of its molecule any 
substance may be distinguished from o.ny other substance. 
;;. ... 
The varied forms of cryste.ls a!Jd chemical structures 
are due to orderly arrane;ments of a.toms. The structure of 
the a tom itself is probably more aOl11~able than even 
that of crystals and molecules, but it is less well l~nown. 
Roughly, there are two parts to the atom, a nucleus and 
~~ outer region of electrons. The nucleus carries a 
positive electrical charge, and in it is centered most 
of the weieht of the atom. In recent years there has 
been some evidence that atoms may be composed of as high 
as six parts. All except the electrons seem to come from 
the nucleus of the atom, while the latter, ranging from ,. 
one to ninet7-two in number, are situated in orbits around 
the nucleus. 
Though we could wish our l-<:l1owledr;e of the atom to 
be more complete, already enough is l~nown to ma}{e us 
realize that infinitesimal portions 'of matter contain 
wo!-,ders of sY;lme try and order comparable perhaps to the 
vast visible order of the stars and of our solar s~rstem. 
I 



denying an ultimate directive Intelligence. Still, we 
. .' 
may say tt any view that regards the universe as realizing 
3 
ends or values is a form Of'teleology.1t 
The opposing camp is made up of all materialists, 
.... 
of course; and, largely, of scientific mechanists and 
mechanistic evolutionists. These, instead of admitting 
tha t the world tends or is direc ted ,oward nr. end, say 
rather that every present phono:rlenon is fully accounted 
for b~ a preceding fact or a series of preceding f'acts. 
No matter what the method of' evolution may have been, 
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ultimately it was merely a redistribution of matter, force, 
and motion or energy. They admit ef'ficient causes but 
deny final causes. Results are had but no finality. 
liJechanism in this modern form owes its origin to Descartes. 
Denying substantial forms he made the essence of corporeal 
substance consist in extension. From this it followed 
that a body has no intrinsic prit1ciple of change and 
activity, and is only capable of receiving local motion 
from some extrinsic source. Such a theory is obviously 
onnosed to intrinsic finality. Batural bodies become 
mere machines. An internal principle of self -perfection' 
is denied. This ttscientif'ic" atti tude with the added 
notion of evolution, to both of which he agrees, is 
colorfully surrnned up by Willie.m ,Tames in his Varieties 
of Religious Experience: 
I 
.'. She (science) catalogues her elements and records 
her laws indiffere"1t as to what purpose may be shown 
forth b;T them, and constructs her tr1eories qui te 
careless of their bearlng on hml1an anxieties and 
fates. Though the scientist may individually nour-
ish a religion, and be a theist in his irresponsible 
hours, the days are over when .i~ could be said that 
for Science herself the heaven13 ~eclare the glory of 
God and the firmament showeth his handiwork. Our 
solar system, with its harmonies, is seen now as but 
one passing case of a certain sort of moving equi-
librium in the heavens, realized by a local accident 
in an appalling wilderness of wofllds 'HLere no life 
can exist. In a span of time which as a cosmic in-
terval will count but as an hour, it will have ceased 
to be. The Darwinian notion of chance production, 
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and subsequent destruction, speedy or deferred, ap-
plies to the largest as well us to the smallest facts. 
It is impossible, in the -present temper of the scien-
tific imagination, to find in the driftings of the 
cosmic atoms, whether tbey work on the universal or 
on the particular scale, anythinG but a kind of 
aimless weather, dOing and undoing, achieving no 
proper history, and leaving no result. Nature has 
no one distinguishable ul t~; tla te tendency wi th which 
it is possible to feel a sympathy. In the vast 
rhythm of her processes, as the scientific mind now 
follows them, she appears to cancel herself. 4 
Still, there are not many mechanists who will deny 
the fact of nature's order. Many of them are as enthus-
iastic about it as are teleologists. Indeed, if all 
idea of purpose were removed from nature, they would be 
the first to admit its order. It is they who have for-
mula ted most of the laws of nature. Teleologists have 
often enough capitalized upon t:heir findings to strengthen 
their own position. No, the disagreement is not about 
order. V{bere the two schools part ways is in accourLting 
I 

tonishine; results. The pur sui t of the exact sciences~, 
however, is not the only characteristic of mechanism. 
Iflechanism is also a s-:rstem of philosophy. It does not 
remain in science and material things, its field of 
specializa tion, but reaches up in'lJ6)'~hilosophy, where 
problems are decided by reason and not by experiment. 
In this thin air, mechanism suffocates. Its renown in 
., 
science lends a specious glow to its false philosophy. 
In this masquerade the unpracticed eye mistakes mechanis-
tic philosophy for the truth. Thus when the mechanist 
claims to measuxe matters of mind, will, and morality 
with meter sti~k and formula, he really convicts himself 
of childishness, but his prestige in his own field makes 
it hard to defend common sense views against him. 
Teleology, on the other hand, labors pnder dif-
ficulties peculiar to itself. First of all, it has the 
disadvantage of having come first. Theories that have 
come down to us from primi ti ve ages are often classed 
by the uncritical as necessarily superstitious. Second-
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ly, finality is said to operate only throuchan intellect, 
and yet we set out to establish finality in nature as 
far as possible without reference to a Supreme Intellect. 
Thirdly, because there are many insta~ces of apparently 
unordered activity; the dust, for example, that is scat-
I 
tered by the ,'Vind; the formation of the clouds; ava-
lanches, waterfalls, volcanoes; and in the realm of 
living things, monsters. A mechm1ist may say, "drop 
.' 
a stone from your hand. Impelled by a physical force 
it tUlilble s to tfl.e f5I'0und. Where :4!'..,the purpose? V'fuere 
is there a final cause? I see an efficient cause and 
nothing 1''1ore. t1 Of course one might answer tha t the per-
son who dropped it had a purpose. .. But let us say that 
the stone after lodging for centuries on the side of a 
mountain, oroke loose one morning and went crasb.ing down 
the precipices. Where was the purpose? Rain and erosion 
had weakened its SlJpport. The force of cravity over-
balanced the equilibrium, and it fell. But purposely? 
48 
Should we, then, abandon attempts to prove finality 
in the inorganic world m1d limit ourselves to the plant 
and animal kingdoms? If we desert the inorganic we ad-
mit defeat in the widest sector of the field. If there 
is no finality in the inorga'1.ic world, if it is governed 
merely by efficient causes, it will be an easy matter 
to extend the ar~urnent to orf':ar. ic nature and even to man. 
The Mechanist will say: I It is the same l'Ta ture work-
ine; mechanically in all the kingdoY:1s of the world; 
which sleeps in the mineral, slumbers in the plant, 
dreams in the animal, and awal:es in man. The insect 
moves because it has powers of locomotion, the bird 
flies because it has wings, men and brutes see because 
they have eyes, and reproduce their kind and perpet-
I 
uate their species because they have organs of ge~­
eration.' It will not suffice for us to challenge 
him with the retort: 'What precisely do you mean 
by Nature?' Our task will be to prove that the bird 
has wines in order to fly, t~'1a t men and brutes have 
e;Tes in order to see, and sexual organs j_n order 
to reprodl'_ce their kind. Is this tasl~ ec.sier than 
that of proving the existence of final causes in 
tIle inorganic world, the world.~ stones, water, sun, 
moon, and stars? A victory in tl'l.e lower kingdom 
will make easy a triumph in the hisher. 5 
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We have said when speaking of,the avalanche that it 
seemed to proceed wi thout purpose. If we are told that 
there is disorder in the ·world, therefore, no finali ty, 
we have a greater right to say that there is a far greater 
amount of order in the world than disorder, therefore, 
there is a greater reason for admi ttinr; purpose, the 
foundation of order. For our argument we lean especially 
upon the conspiracy of causes that go to make ~lp the 
intrinsic order of nature. li;any examples were described 
in the previous chapter. 
There we saw the geometrical structures of the 
atoms, molecules, ar:.d IJrystals. If atoms merely COllle 
togetl1er, and form molecules and cr:',Tstals, 
and not also J::o form them, why the exact nmnbers for eac)J. 
substance? 7fh~r the symmetrical formations? Eo1.1 the uni ty 
and stability of the molecule? How does one cell divide 
and multiply till it becomes a full grown ·organism, and 
why does the organism always quit growing after a certain 
I 
period of development? And, a.gain, how can we say tha.t 
.. 
when an orga.nism is wounded the cells nerely :r1ul tiply 
but not in order to heal the wound? ltfhy should the 
bee's legs be so delicately and so finely adjusted if 
it were not in .()E_~er to carry polle:rl.f 
In other words, we offer to the nlechanis t ca.ges 
whe:re apparently, there has been a cj}1spiracy of causes 
to produce a definite, determined effect. If he would 
admi t a real conspiracy he would Dot dif.fer from 1JS. 
But if he contends that the consniracy of causes is only 
apparent, he must fall back on one of two explanations. 
He may say that those physical, that Is, efficient causes 
cooperate b~T mere chance, or he may ;;ay--and this is his 
best argument--tha t the apparent Doolinc~ of caUGes is no 
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more th2..n a case of physical forces added to physical for-
ces, from which only physical forces may be eXl?ected to 
result. It is this force, according to h~m, that pro-
duces the apparently purposed effect. 
In the beginning we may challenge the universal 
statement that physical forces Fldded to ph7sical forces 
give only a sma total of physical forces. Is it not pos-
sible that prescinding from the forces in question, the very 
conbination of ca1].ses is a phenomenon that requj.res the 
intervention of a final cause? Certainly it is a uhenom-
L . ~ 
I 


53 
key to natrue's order and the designer of her manifold 
.' 
pa tterns. 
The othe~ possible explanation of order and deter''Ier-
mined activities and effects is the stil;t more absurd 
... ., 
recouY.'se to crance. A deus ex machina explanation of a 
phenomenon is r.early always an admission of ir:::norance. 
The plausibilit~ of the chance account of.order Etnd, in- -.1.-
deed, of the 8listen.ce of the whole universe is based on !ten 
the fact that some things in the world do hapDen by chanofLnce. 
The inference is supposed to be: "Therefore everything 
happens by chance." A few words, therefore, on the pos - - -
sibili ty of explaining intrinsic order by chance will noto_ot 
be out of place, 
Chance fu"ises from the coincitience of two or more e e 
causes acting independently of each other, or from the 
coincidence of effects which have been independently 
produced. The eruption of Vesuvius was caused by an 
explosion in tbe earth w:bich happened accordinp' to nat-
ural laws. The ci ty of Pompeii Vias Dlaced near Vesuvius 
purposely. Rut its being buried under Vesuvius' lava 
was accidental. Thus, evidently, the scholastic thesis 
on final i ty does 'lot say that no thin£; happens by chance~ 
bu t, ra ther, trat no t everything happens by chanc e • It 
is ?:lot possible tha t everything should happen by chance 
as 
8 
t, 
6 
I 
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e the accidental presUIX1!I!~eSUpposes the intentional. All 
is accidental. Chanc~~LiU1nce is the result of an acciden-
of two cause~IDuses, and is, therefore, an 
'.'Ihich is beside the iml~e intention or natural tenden.cies 
acting causes. 
There are at leas t thrd 
7 
three phenomena which chance can-
1) Persistence.,e:lmce. Even if.i t were possible 
the order of nature couJJr~)Could have resulted from a fortu-
colloca tion of chemica]J21.D..cal matter, the same principle 
not account for the com~ continuance of order. Our intel-
naturally distihgl.lishes ~dhes between events that happen 
and unexpectedly, and Dll~nd those which happen regularly. 
morning a tile falls ~:o.ls near me as I pass a certain 
.... \.L.L,u!'., I will suppose that;Jsitthat it was an accident and think 
it. But if it ben:ibdlJegins to happen regularly every 
evan if I were a mec~el mechanist I should soon suspect 
icious intention. 2) UruijO Unity of effect from multipli-
The human eY1;ern eye is ~ good example of thi s. 
1 all the parts that mUS2li~ must cooperate. The muscles, 
, iris, punil, cornea, SCO! II!!II sclerotic coa t, the rods and cones, 
s numerous other factoMok~tors which must unite to pro-
the one effect of seei~jE3ing. Such unity of effort on 
the causes towar~~\Nards a definite effect cries 
a sufficient reaS8wreason. Whence comes it unless 
I 
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If both sides had listened to their a.udiences they would 
have heard the right answer. To the German philosophers 
the people would have said, "Dust thou art, and to dust 
returnest;" and for the instruction of the English 
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would have empha.tically added, nWas;;.r~t spoken of the soul." 
This is the CO!!1I'lOn sense answer and it is the answer of 
scholastic philosophy. When the extremist inquires into 
the causes of the world he will ask, ~re there only final 
causes in the universe, or are there only efficient causes?" 
He always feels tb,a t by the adJl1ission of one of tvro opposites 
the other is necessarily excluded even when the opposites 
may not be at all contradictory. But if we place our 
original problem, whether birds fly because they have wings, 
or have vangs in order to fly, before the oracle of common 
sense, t.re response will be brief but sure, 'tHot either, 
but both." 
Certainly, the bird would never fly if its wings 
were not mechanical struct1..U'es of a kind that would be 
sufficient to help it overcome the :.~,ull of grav.i ty and 
the resistance of the air. But it would also seem that 
no matter how it .came to have Wings, whether bye volution 
or by immediate creation, it has them also ~n ~rde~ to 
fly. Else why should it have wi!1e;s at all? This is 
no more strange than my using an automobile to ri.de to 
work every morning. The machine, indeed, is mechanical, 
I 
but I have bought it and I use it for a purpose. Thus., 
there is no di ,'ficulty in admi tting both final and effi-
cient causes. Indeed, the trouble has always come when 
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one or the other was denied. They CD. 1.JD.ot work separately. 
Except in the case of God, the Fir 3it"""Cause , Who is not 
influenced by any cause outside Himself, the final and 
efficient ca
'
"J ses s.re alwa.ys found together. tlThe causal-
-. ity of the idea, or final causality is not adequately 
distinct from efficient causality. The former does not 
operate apart from the latter. It completes it, adding 
2 
to it a direction." 
II. The Logical Objection. In assigning causal 
efficacy to ends, one of the diff'icultj.8s which arise 
immediately is how the end which in some cases does not 
yet exist, end in no case exjsts in so .far as it is a 
cause, can be the cause of sorre thin,~ that will exi st 
in the future. Professor Hobhouse puts the difficulty in 
3 
the question tt:!)oes the non-existent cause the existent?" 
To illustrate he proposes the case of a di.:1ner which, 
considered as ~~ end, would be the cause of a series of 
actions ne ces sary toe 011vey one from his office to hi s 
home. He then asks, but what of the udinner which does 
not come off?'· 
If 0. mechanist offered th:1.s difficulty we could 
I 
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parry by saying that tre past by which he attempts to .' 
explain the present is just as non-existent as the f1Jtt1re. 
However, if VIe tr7r to offer a more rational explanation, 
our first observat,ion will be that e viden tly there is no 
differe!1.ce whatever as far as causai:L"t-y is concerned 
whether the meal was served or not as long as the person 
concerned ~houl:Pt it would be awaiting biw. This much is 
" a fact that we all :'nov{ from experience. It is sufficient 
if the end exists in the mind. Here yre have the answer 
to our problem in so far as one can be given. It is not 
a case of non-being causing being, but it is the case 
of a possible being apprehended as good inducing the ef'-
ficient cause to produce or obtain it, or, at least, to 
try to bring it into actuality or possession. The Br-
roneous conception produces the necessary actions to at-
tain the end until the error is rectified. The execution 
or acquisition of the end in case of error may remain 
incomple te. The di fficulty is J.ess severe if we remember 
tbe nature of the appetite which corre sponds to the f1 nal 
cause. From tre very first monent of our existence 
we are inclined towards the good. ThUS, we are, as it w$re" 
already off dead center in the direction of the end, 
which is convertible with good, before it is concei ved 
in t he mind. This a1 so helps us to see the causal :'1a tLlre of 
an objective. Perhaps it less th~n o~e might have imagin-
I 
ad. It determines, directs, diverts the appetite whic~ 
by nature already tends towards good in general. 
The abov~ remarks have been an endeavor to explain 
briefly the manner in which the non-~xistent (not the 
non-real) influences the agent which will bring it to 
actuality. Perhaps a more satisfactory answer would be 
desira9le, but the difficulty loses m.ch of its force 
the moment we recoe;nize the certainty of the fact. 
Even the fact cannot be admi tted by 8. pure materialist, 
but it is evident to anyone who admits mind. The mind 
can look to tre future and plan .just as easily as it can 
look to the past and remember. 
Once t~e problem is solved for intelli~ent bein~s 
there is no difficulty for natLu'Ial bodies, for although 
their principle of direction is innate in them, ultimate-
ly they are deter'mined to their end by another who has 
mind. 
III. The Anthropomorphic Objection. The anthro-
pomorphic objection runs as follows: "the whole idea of 
purpose or end is derived from human psychology, and •••• 
only human conceit would make bold to read the cosmic 
4 
process in terl!lS analogous to hl.D:lan experience. It 
Before we can discuss this difficulty intelligent-
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I 
11 we must come - Ble to s orne agreement on a defini tiorl. of .' 
anthropomorphism mB sm. Baldwin f s D~?ti_~l~:Y ei ves the fo110w-
ing: AnthropomoIon.morphism is 'tthe assumption of hur:J.an beings 
tbB. t tl-:e ir own cH~ - characteristics are present in beings 
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or fe-cts widely ov,y different from them1!~ves, mope )13.rticu1ar-
5 
11 in gods or in nr in the forces of nature. U The word has 
'most frequently 1i~y been used in the history of religion 
•• 
to denote a tendebrr ndency in early peoples, especially the 
ancient (freeks, -I' to attribute hunan bodies, passions, 
needs, faults, a..r<~ a.."'1C1 charo.c teris tics to their gods. The 
word is also useoeased to signify the a ttributing of tb.ese 
'seme c:r.aracterisf~tistics to rdembers of the animal, plant, 
(" 
~r mineral '''lOrJd.bOd. 
'liVe must cs~ carefully distinguish this use of the word 
trom the doctrinenline of analogy. It is impossible for us to 
8peak of the Inf:R1rnfinite Being, for example, exce:;Jt in terms 
deri ved from hU}11sriklll11an experience. We say that He is 'Beine, 
:that He bas inteI9;l:;e11ect, will, life, personality, becP.l'se 
we can prove fromo'rom reason that these are essential qualities 
'Of a '1ecessary bed being. It is true that we draw these 
notions first fro",~ro:tl our own experience. out vlhen we apply 
them to God we dab do not mean that He l')ossesses them in the 
lame sense or degstlegree in which we T)03SeSS tYem. We speak 
( 
~a1ogous1y, not jot anthropomorphically. We predicate a 
~ , 
I 
human property to a being that is not human, not, inde~d, 
in a univocal sense, sut understanding that there will 
be at least a partial similarity, but Dossibly a far 
greater dissimilarity. 
Let us now turn our attention to finali'by. When 
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teleologists are accDsed of anthropomorphism the objection 
may be understood in two senses: fir$t, it may be an 
imputation of real anthropomorphisn. Whenever there is 
evidence for this error the accusation is just. But 
if it is taken in a broader sense by which it would mean 
that because we first get the notion of p·l).rpose from 
human experie 11ce it is illicit to apply it to a being of 
any other nature, in other words, if it wishes to make 
anthropomorphism sJ"TIon~1lnous wi th analogy, j.t misunderstands 
the natnre of hrL."1Tlan thought, and underestim.ates its value. 
1~e could hardly r:et outside of ourselves wi thout the use 
of analogy. The Humane Society would not be so solicitous 
for the care of dumb animals if it did not think they feel 
pain in a way similar to that in which men suffer. ':Jut 
they ca~ know this o'''ly through analogy. 1.r1e can know 
that other men think the same way that we do only by the 
perfect analogy we see existing :)etweeIl their words and 
actions and our own. 
Hence, al though the argur.-18nt from sufficient 
I 
reason is the strongest argument for finality in nature~ 
• 
the analogical arrsument is valid. Scientists continually 
make use of the principle that like causes produce like 
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effects. The principle is just as valid if turned around: 
"Like effects have like causes." T:Qe...teleolorrist sees 
the order and adaptation in nature. nBut order, n he 
argues, "or at least continuous and persistent order is 
• always the result of purpo se. Therefore, tJ'iere is pur-
pos e in the world. It 
IV. The Dysteleological Objection. 
There are facts that seem to point to a purpose. 
There are as many more facts that seem to point to 
an indifferent or malevolent universe. To select 
the teleolop:ical facts while ignoring the dysteleo-
logical is to deceive oneself. 'Teleolo~y is an 
illusion.' 6 
This is a broad ob,iection opposing the whole problem ..... 
of evil to tre arguments for finali ty in the world. This 
is truely the most serious objection to a metaphysics 
of finality. It is not that any other system, whether of 
monism, mechanism, or pantheism can explain tt better, 
or even as well, but after all has been said that can be 
said, there still remains the fact of evil in the world, 
and its l.llt:i.mate Uwhylt is a m;Tstery. It is evident that 
the world is not the best possible, absolutely speaking, 
as Leibnitz supposed. But God DaS created the world for 
I 
reasons of His own, and we can be certain that He created 
4fi 
at least relatively the finest ',ossi18 Vlorld, i.e., the 
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one best suited to accomplish His own inSCrlJtable designs. 
Since it is not given us to fathom the intentions of the 
Infinite Wisdom in creating the lm~V&rSe, naturally there 
will be certain factors in it the purpose of which we will 
not be able to understan~. 
not a denial of plJrPO se. 
~ut ignorance of purpose is 
• Certainly we have found uses 
for tbings which in the oast were considered purposeless. 
However, we lY'ust s till account for thi.ngs tha tare cer-
tHinly evil. The answer here must be limited to uhvsical 
" ~ 
evils, but correct general notions qf evil will also be 
applicable to moral deordinations. 
The nature of evil can be brou[;ht out more clear ly 
by contrasting it wi tl:. essential or o;'ltological n~oodness. 
Good is that which is suitable or desirable to any nature. 
Good in this sense is cooxtensi ve wi th being, for there is 
no being for vtlich at least existence is not suitable or 
desirable. Good, too, is closely connected vii th end, 
for that is Good for a being which perfects it, i.e., 
Which helps it attain its end. ::Ve continually think of . 
good in this rela tionship. "fha t do we mean vJ'nen we say 
that a rifle is good or that a bird dog is good except 
that they oe (~ood for the end for 'Nhich they are intended? 
Every end is in some sense good, and every good could be 
I 
considered under tlJ.e aspect of end. Thus 
the two formulae, 'The good is t1:at which beings 
de sire, or towards which they na tl,;~ral17T tend, , 
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.' 
and 'The goorl is that which is adapted to the ends 
which beiEGs have in their existence,' really come to 
the same t:Cillg;' tb~ former statement resolving itself 
into the latter as more fundamwal. 7 
In the concrete ['ood is identic::.l with any real -;eing, 
for t~lere is no -aeing wl::.ich c::mnot bE\ cO,lceived as the 
term either of its own appetite or as the term of some 
other beine's appetite. 
If· everything is ontolog5_cally good, it follows 
that there can be no. being which is e'11"l. And this is 
the scholastic teaching in spite of its admission of evil 
in the vlorld. As good is to be identified vd th being, 
so evil is iden.tical with 1:.on-being,:Clot, however, with 
absolute nothinG, b1.Jt with tlabsence of the good which 
8 
Just as TIe never see 
color alone but only colored objects, so evil as such or 
as a positive reality separate from a subject of inherence 
9 
simply does not exist. Disease, blindness, WEtr, death 
are always wi th us. They are never alone, however, but 
10 
always in some subject. 
Wi th these preliminary notions about the .nll ture of 
evil, the reconciliation of teleology with physical evil 
in the world nay be treated with dispatch. 
I 
1) Evil, as VIe have seen, is always seated in., 
a subject, therefore, in a good. This is sufficient to 
11 
answer those wbo imagine a totally male"lolent universe. 
2) IiIany things that are apparently useless or 
.... 
even harmful rra::' serve unknovm purposes. Some of the 
endocrine glands, for exren~)le, were 10':1.8 thouE;ht to be 
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mere vestiges, but are now knovm to ltave useful functions. 
3) rrhere are many cases where the evil is so 
rela ti ve tha t t he Good occasioned by the evil is obvious-
ly equal or greatep than the damage done. lilan and cer-
tain animals must inflict death on other animals and on 
plants to provide themselves with food. Death to one 
is life to the other. Besides, what overcrowding we 
should soon have if no animals on ear th ever died? 
4) The metaphysical reason 'Nhy evil does not con-
tradict teleology is that nothing ever tends towards evil 
as an end (unless under the appeapance of a Good~ Evil 
is related to teleology in aJ.r10st the sane way as chance. 
It always results accidentally, or at least secondarily 
to the primary tendency. Whatever evil or flaw there ;nay 
be in any effect is the result of defect in the prin-
Ciple of a ction. Hence, St. Aur:us tine says tha t nevil 
12 
has not an efficient cause but only a deficient one." 
I 
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Thus, if a monster is born it :Ls due to a defect in bhe 
primary cells or in the genital organs of the parent or 
to some similar disorder, and not to a n~tural tendency 
in the embryo towards imperfection. Such a diseased 
;;, ... 
embryo still tends towards its end and natural perfection. 
It tends, however, only in so far as it is sr. operative 
princj.ple, and not in so far as it il defective. Thus, 
when an agent fails to attain its end, it is not a sign 
of a false tendency towards defect or destruction. It is 
because of failure to act completely, or because its ac-
tion was thwarted by some cou..."1teractivity. This failure 
to reach the end is evil. But the evil is not the object 
of the natural tendency. It is due, rather, to circum-
13 
stances. 
Still, it :may be urged, explain it how you will, ..... 
evil remains. This is true, arld the teleological 'Norld-
view is not so radically optimistic as to deny it. But 
the fact of evil vall remain no r'lstter what system of 
philosophy one adopts. It is that system which can best 
explain evil and all the other difficulties tl::.at should 
be accepted. The scholastic teleologist is convinced 
that his system labors under tbe fewest inherent dif-
ficulties. 
v. The Evolutionary Objection. 
I 
The theory of evolution has re jected the 'spe<'ial 
creation' theory •••• Evolution has also explained the 
adapta tions to environment by the tlteory of natural 
selection •••• Hence present adaptations are not the 
work of a cr-eator 'Nho made orr;anisTI1s as they are, 
fully eqld;)!)ed for the battle of life, but they are 
the result of a sifting-process, which involves the 
apparently aimless birth and ~eitruction of countless 
maladjusted or poorly equirrped org:-, uisms ••••• 
In another direction evoh,tioll seemed to undermine 
belief in a world-purpose. TrnrH tional philosophy 
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and theolocy had usually regnrded the :!:mrpose or 
purposes embodied in the univers\ as etel"nal Hna un-
changine •••• The theory of evolution has laid rude 
hands upon thifl ark. It sees in change and gro'wth 
and tm emerp;erlce of genuine novel tie s the mos t 
characteristic features of our world. If evolution be 
true, the real i ty that e!l1bodie s i tse If in the '.'10rld-
process cannot be et,=::rnally static. 14 
The first of the above objections mfty be resolved 
into two parts: 1) thB rejection of the "special creation" 
theol"Y in favor of t}le evolution of s'gecies. 2) The af-
fir:nation that evolution of species involves the aimless 
birth and destruction of countless maladjusted organisms. 
It 'Jilill not be possible here to c ons1der tr_ese 
theories historically, nor exhau3t~vely in any sense. 
But let us for a moment turn on each one the light of a 
little 10[:lc in order to see hOI"! the~T affect the ar:::;uments 
. 
'which, we maintain, prove the objectivity of f1nal causes 
in nature. 
First of all, the "special creationU theory must 
be carefully distinguished from the absolute or direct 
I 
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creation of the matter of the world wi th i t8i.i. ts laws and.' 
order. katter co'~,'ld not of its own f)OVlOr har. ha'le arison 
fror..: 'lop-matter. r.r':<is phil02wpll.1cal ,;ost~:la~, :late based on 
tbe ~l;'llprer:.nable nrinciple of causali t~T is '08.; be;Tond the realm 
of sciel~tific evolu tion. In regard t~ "ine S B evoluti on of 
the species vIe should distini"uish between tHI the orip:in 
of the first soo cies and the ori'dn of thosG2c;:Jse species which 
. " ... 
r~ave s'J,pposedly developed from preexistinCi 0[3 ones. For with 
rec,pect to the f'i,rst species there is the pur probleD} of :row 
life came from non-life. Scienc:e has proveo8vved tba tall 
past and prese~lt tl'..eories of spontaneous p:er:e~eneration hDve 
bee~1. myths. Philosophy also ca.1Js our a ttenfjj~ntion to tbe 
fact tl,at ~1.0 being can Give to 8.nother what jss,t itself does 
not in some wa7 possess. To state the cont~,ntrary would be 
to hold that entity could come from nor-ent:jrm.tity. lilatter 
mir'ht have developen. some Simple orgc.nizatiolttion which would 
be ,:"1 fA. voral;le rece tacle f or life. Eut at jr.;a t one time there 
had to corle 8, flash of life. ':['he orly e xpl~li[Plana tion of 
t[lis first '1i tal flash which coincides wi th ftth the prin-
ciDles of logic and tbe findin"?s of science e~ce is a creative 
act. It would n.ot necessarily be creatiO'l :r~'I in tbe stric#t 
sense, a s in the crea tio!l, of ,ila tter, for th-r!tthe :ma tter would 
already be at hand. It could ")e ',"That is ROl"fo~o1J1etimes called 
l,t:; 
secondary creation or Divine Admicllstrationnoon. Thus, strict-
1:1 speaking, the question of eVolution and :bd finality is 
I 
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restricted to the appearance of new variations of pr~i-
tive species for whose existence 'Ire r'117e nssi,n'ned a suf-
ficient reason. 
The forepoin~ remarks have.~een laid dawn as a 
-' -. .. ... 
foundation without which evolution ca)'1 rave no intelligible 
meanin'-. '1hen we look upon evolution as the s'Ystematic 
Growth ~)'1d develoomeY) t of tlJe 'U..l1i vefse which took its 
inception from the Greator, it ~atter3 little to scholas-
tic teleolog7 w~ether ~e sa~ that each snecies was separ-
ately created or 'tlhether the new was sO!r1ef1.ow generated 
ty the old. It came ultimatel7 from the Creator, and, 
logically, if there is development, it should be accor-
dine; to Fis intention. In this light, evolution is not 
only not onposed to teleology, but furnishes Rnother ar-
gument in. its favor. 
Nm"l to the second DOint of the objection which ma~r 
be stated thus: 'In the process of evolution thousands 
of lmfit plants and ar1imals pe:eish aimlessly. Only the 
fi t survive.' Let us ask, Vlha t if none of the:t:1 did die? 
i"ould finali ty ha'lTe a sounder basi s1 Or, would they not 
destroy man whom they are intended to serve? In the 
supposition that no plants or animals would die, men 
and animal s would have to Ii ve on water and the mi.nerals 
of the earth as plants do, and plants would so multinl;T 
I 
as to smother and crowd out men and animals, and, in«eed, 
they would soon exhavst tr.1e fertil1ty of the soil, which 
in -She present system is partially replenishedl1;T the 
corruntton of dead matter, and be doomed to starve. Our 
conclusion is that unless some di~ '1.11 will die. Death 
is 1'1ecessary that life may continue. Therefore, while 
death is t'he frustration of the immediate end of "~he 
.. 
individual, it is not a frustratj.on of the principle of 
finality, as was explained in answer to the dysteleolog-
ical objection. Death serves rather a larger and more 
ultimate end. 
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Darwin's theory of selection on which the objection 
is basen cannot alone account for a tJ,eory of race-evo-
lution. To try to explain present species by pointing 
out the. t the7T are the survivors of countle ss numbers ,.. 
tr..a t have ;)6rished, is almost like sa7ir..r: tha t there are 
two hundred lenves on a certain tree becal)se all tbe 
others have fallen off. Thus, tllose who would unhold 
that D8.rt of the Darwi:rlian theorv which tries to account 
for the s·urvival of the fi t by the fall of the weak, have 
yet toaccou1'lt for the 'arrival of t}le fit.' If tl;ere 
were no design in t;he world the falOt thHt h:T far the i~r08. ter 
majority arrive fit would be an insoluble problem. 
If Darwinism be accepted in the loose sense of 
I 
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evolution in:-;:eneral, we min:ht I?r;ree wi tIl Darwin' s s~ 
when he YvTi te s : 
One of the lIT'ea tes t services re "'dered bv m'T father 
to the study of natural historv is the rev~:'iJai of 
teleoloO'y. 'The evolutionist s.h-1-dies the purpose or 
meaning of organs wi th the zea" .... of the older teleology, 
but VQ ttl far vvi der 8.~d more coherent Dur pose. He 1180 S 
the invigorating 1-cnowledr;e tha t be is gaining, not 
isol1'1.ted concentions of the economy of tbe present, 
but a coherent view of both past and ~resent. And 
even where }'e fails to disCOVEll-' the 1.1se of any Dart, 
he may, by a lmowledr~e of j.ts structure, unravel 
the history of the past vicissitudes in tbe life of 
the species. In this wa;! a vip;or and unity is Kiven 
to the study of the form of orGanized bei"1gs, whicl-:;. 
before it lacked. 16 
Rut Darwinism in the stricter an.d truer ser.se of 
the word accordh~r: to ",{hich the evolution of species is 
due eEtireJ.y to chailc e varia tio::ls is not comDa tible with 
scholastic teleolo~y. 
Yet, while scholasticism Cal'1not accept DarWinism, 
it finds in evolution itself (10 co/'tradiction of its doc-
triCle of teleoloi~.Y, but a broadening and enoblinr; of the 
concept. There is a. prinCiple in scholastic philoso;:)hy 
which says tr..at 'it is not permis8ible to postulate an act 
of the Creator to expl2.in a pheno:nenon which may be aec€mnt-
.- 18 
ed for by natural causes.' 1Yhatever, therefore, caY) 
be explained by evolution must not be attributed to the 
direct action of the Creator. There is i':reater elabor-
ation of desien in an evolutionary system than in a 
I 
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s tp. tic ore. 4' 
To plan out a lJ.ni verse of fini te en ti tie s, differinG 
in essence and in grades of perfection, is doubtless 
a work of sU"perhuman wisdom; but to include in the 
design the furthel" idea, of conferri:1C on these entities 
a complex va}'iet~r of forces, qrl,alitios, active a~:1d 
passive, faculties by virtue &.f· ... which nature could 
ever grow out of itself B-nd developfrol1 lower to hir~her 
forms-of existence, and should multiply along definite 
lines of being; to conceive a world wt~08e consti tv-
ents would ceaselessly energize on one a!lOther, yet 
wi thout confusion and in 8.;:1 adm~8ble order; to allow' 
to the creature its own proper causal i ty, a~1d ye t, 
even in snite of the manifold action of free will in 
a countless multiplicity of immortal intelliG"ences, 
to elaborate a nerfect uni ty; surely this is an 
incalculabl-y hin;her ~;}anifestatioE of wisdom. It serves 
to manifest the DOl,'ler of the Creator; for every cause 
is proportioned to tne effect. But the completion of 
a desin;n such as has been described, is a more noble 
effect than if e very production of natural operation 
were the result of irnmediate creation. 19 
Similar quota ti ons could be r,ml tiplied, but those 
given will sul'flce to show that defendors of teleology 
find nothin" incompatible between final CS1JSeS aEd a rea-
sonable theory of evolution. 
Little need be said in answer to the second objec- I 
tion. When it speaks of the ttptlrpose or purposes em-
bodied in the universe", it refer8 to the ultimate physical, 
, 
subsistent end of the univ0:r'se, that 'which is p01jularly 
called God. 
How any thoughtful person who knows sf'.ything about 
what the concept of God must ccntain, could say that 
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He is a product of evolution is incon::;rehel'sible. T~' 
evolve mea ·s to unroll. How ';-ou. can't fl[',ve unrollinp mere-
u 20 ' 
fu"1d tb.is some-
thing must have a cause which itself is ',-ot caused. Other-
wise matter would hf:'.ve to be the ca~se of its own e:dste~1ce. 
It vJOuld have to exist before it existed 1Nhich is abs·urd. 
The conclus ion is the same 'lOt onl v for m8. tter, but for 
.' .. 
a~:1ythiYle: fini te. Therefore, the Uncaused Cause [,lust be 
a being that is infinitely perfect. :}ut vlhat is infin-
i tely perfec t cannot chal'f,;e, for in the c o11cept of change 
is included the .':;.otion of acquiring or lOSinG some per-
fection. ~)ut in a being wl::.ich is infinitely perfect 
there can be neither liability of loss nor possibility 
of gain. rrherefore, the notion that God is beirJg 
brought forth in the IGoors of a world-process is chi-
ruerical. 
Evolution, therefore, far from weakening tlle evi-
dence for teleolon;y, aug!:1ents and corroborates it. 1' .. n 
effic:lent cc:!'se rather gains than loses prestige by working 
through secondar~T agents. Our concept of God is nobler 
if we suppose trtU t He created the world wi th laws and 
powers for development than if we imar.sine that lIe had 
constantly to intervene in order to create a new variety 
or species or to extinp'uish an oln one. 
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tione1":, simodo pona tur Deum ad hoc primi tus iis 
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vols.; e di ti 0 al tera.; Fri burgf-BrTa';~-v-i8~: Eerder ~--1897) , 
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20. Wbe.tever becomes anew msut taie its origin from 
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St. T!lO:mHS, ,Ope ,c::!.~., Bk. I, ch. 13 (fin~. 
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I 
ClIA.PTj~R VI 
Some of thB recent Introductions to Philosophy 
devote a section to v:hat they call. 'Ji;}!e u;:tew teleolo[,;y.n 
as Lloyd I,iorp:an are a;~onC those wbo defend this V"j,9W • 
• Their tbeory uJ)holds an irmnanent teleolog~'T akin to that 
of Ber[!;son \'l'lOSG theory has already bee,n nentioned. Ac-
79 
cording to this theory ~~o rr1ind is reql15_reri, to cO,lcei ve the 
principle s of na tlJ.re' s order. ?rom the viewpoint of 
being the worlrt is an orGanism i~ ~b~ch the )arts are 
ordered to th0 whole an,d the whole to the parts. Its 
activity is a 1dnd of creati'lG evoh'tion, 8. process of 
self-realization and achievement. This realization pre-
sumably ',"loulcl consist in tllife, individuality, mind, 
1 
consci01.lsness, social or:~anization, freedom, morality," 
but whether Yla ture 'vi 11 ever corrie to tbe end of its ten-
def'.cy crea ti ire evolution generally does L,ot say. This 
wi th i t3 postula te of an, inlma_ent, all-absor1JL':,e; mind, , 
consti tutin(j no. tlJ.re, 'Norkinf£ in it a,nd ordering it t-:Jrour;h 
evolutionar~ laws. Both'are pantheistic. 
Superior, we believe, to either of these theories 
I 

.' is a "pull" rather than g. "push", an attraction, not a 
goad. But scholastics add that God is the author 
of b oth tr~ ends and the tendencies. Say \vhat you will 
is intermediate; He is the fj.rs t beginnin[:~ D.nd the lflst 
end. Herein the scholastic doctrine is more complete and 
ultimate. Of wb:ct vaJue is a tendency towards an h'rrnec1i-
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ate :::00.1 or end? Of ':/b8. t val ue is ~n inmlediate zoal even 
when attained? Even if we supuosed tl'0 mat erial l.miverse 
to be homocentric, and tbat all the ends of all the beings 
ir~ the war ld were fulfilled in lJecoming for man an 
object ei the I' of use or delight or contemplation; of what 
val ue would it all be if 111an also did not have a goal, 
an eternal, infinitely ss.tisfying object of all his desires 
and loves, and through m8.n all things else? In the schoJas-
tic systen this ob ject is given. It is God. All thinD'S 
( .. ) 
were created by Him becavse of Fis desire to communicate 
His goodness to others. All thincs tend tow'ards Him, 
man illL>:lediately, aDd through ::'0.9.n the lesser creatllres .. 
Not by absorption in God, however, bl1t by love and contem-
plation of Him 1::an will find his happiness. When man has 
attained bis Coal the material vfOI'ld shall have served 
its purpose and will be needed no longer. ~3ut while 
it exists we can still sey Uthe heayens show forth the 
glory of God. It This in brief is the complenent which the 
older teleolor~y offers to the new. 
I 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER VI .' 
1. Geore;e Thomas White Patrick, Introduction to 
Philosophy (New York: Houghton MifflIn Company, 1~4), 
p. 163. 
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!he thesis, "The Order of ttur. aDd the 
Problem of Teleology" , ni tten by James Stuart 
tong, S.J •• has been aocepted by the Graduate 
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